Amid Serious Threats, Israel Tries Shaping a New Reality in Syria

March 11, 2025

by: Ron Ben-Yishai ~ Ynetnews

Tuesday, 11 March 2025 | The massacre carried out by Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces in the Alawite mountains of western Syria strengthens Israel’s perception that these emerging threats require early preparedness. This is not only due to the jihadist [‘holy’ war waged on unbelievers in Islam] threat posed by those who have seized power and are attempting to present a moderate and stable image, but also because of the understanding that Syria could become a hub of fragile political stability, including the military bases Turkey’s Erdogan seeks to rebuild in line with his vision of a neo-Ottoman empire.

One of the fastest-developing and particularly concerning threats to Israel’s security comes from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ], who may seek to operate from Syria against Israeli border communities in the Golan and Upper Galilee. It has been revealed that in the early days when rebel organizations, united under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS —the Syrian Liberation Organization), took control under al-Sharaa’s leadership, they released senior terrorists from Hamas and PIJ from prisons. These individuals had been imprisoned by Bashar Assad to avoid antagonizing Israel with their planned attacks. Even for the “Butcher of Damascus,” they were too extreme.

Now that they’ve been freed, senior Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives may already be planning attacks. In recent weeks, Israeli airstrikes targeted several weapons depots that these terror organizations managed to hide, even from the Syrian regime. For now, the Palestinian terrorists have not attempted to move southward from the Damascus area toward the Israeli border, but they remain active and are making plans.

Another factor involves the Sunni residents of southern Syria, many of whom are influenced by ISIS and are concentrated in the area of Daraa, where the Sunni rebellion against Assad’s regime began. While Israel maintains dialogue with some of these groups through local Syrian intermediaries in the Golan—who benefited from Israel’s “Good Neighbor” project during the Syrian civil war—these extreme Sunni elements, part of the “Southern War Room,” currently refuse to commit to peaceful relations with Israel.

Meanwhile, Turkey has made no secret of its ambitions to dominate Syria through the Sunni jihadist regime it supports and assists. While Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and al-Sharaa are not directly subordinate to Turkey, they rely on Ankara as their sole logistical channel. As such, they must heed Erdogan’s wishes and avoid acting against him.

For now, it seems Turkey does not intend to fully control Syria but rather to turn it into a political and military proxy by establishing a new Syrian army and bases across the country, including in southern regions just miles from Israel’s border. Israel has no interest in having Turkey on its border in the Golan, especially not a combination of former al-Qaida jihadists and Turkish forces.

Currently, Erdogan is more focused on gaining control over the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria. However, what prevents him from achieving this militarily is the presence of American troops, supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF], which consist of Kurds and Sunni Arab tribes successfully fighting ISIS.

Another actor concerned about Turkish dominance is Russia, which seeks to maintain its airbase in Hmeimim, south of the Alawite city of Latakia, and its naval base in Tartus, both located on Syria’s western coastline. These bases are essential for Russia to maintain its presence in the eastern Mediterranean and sustain connections with its strongholds in Africa. However, these bases are currently limited, as Syria has prohibited Russia from conducting flights in its airspace or navigating its territorial waters.

There is also concern Turkey may arm and train al-Sharaa’s jihadist forces. Although Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in taking on this role, believing they are better suited than Turkey, Israel argues that there is no rush to support al-Sharaa and his forces. From Israel’s perspective, the central question is whether they truly intend to moderate and abandon their jihadist goals to focus on rebuilding Syria.

In light of these threats, Israel intends to shape a new reality in the area near its border, south of Damascus. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz have already stated that Israel will not tolerate armed members of the new regime in Damascus moving southward, nor will it allow the armed Sunni jihadist forces in the south to roam the Syrian Golan.

The area contains many abandoned Syrian military outposts, filled with weapons that could easily be used by hostile elements against Israel. In addition to direct warnings sent to the Damascus regime, Israel seeks to establish a defensive framework of three geographic zones.

The closest zone to Israel is the buffer zone, as determined in the 1974 ceasefire agreements, where Israel maintains an unlimited presence, including on the Syrian Hermon crown. This strategic location allows monitoring of activity not only in the Damascus basin but also in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. This buffer zone, varying in width over several miles, stretches from the summit of the Syrian Hermon to the Jordan–Syria–Israel border triangle near Al-Hama.

Beyond the buffer zone, where IDF troops are permanently stationed, lies the security zone, encompassing many Syrian villages. The IDF enters this area as needed for operational purposes, such as preventing the arming of abandoned weapons depots or responding to the presence of armed groups threatening Israeli border communities. This zone provides observation and fire capabilities over long ranges.

Further beyond the security zone is what Israel refers to as the “influence zone,” delineated in the east by the Damascus-Sweida road (the capital of the Druze region, Jebel al-Druze). This zone spans about 40 miles [64.3 km.] and includes Druze concentrations in Jebel al-Druze, as well as Sunni Arabs interested in ties with Israel. During the civil war, the Druze region effectively became an autonomous area. Israel aims to maintain this status quo even as Syria stabilizes.

Israel views the Druze region and its residents as a group to which it has a commitment, including providing protection and essential supplies. Additionally, Israel is considering allowing Druze residents of Sweida to work in Israel to support themselves, similar to the “Good Fence” policy with Lebanon.

In practice, these three zones already exist: the outposts in the buffer zone have been built, IDF patrols the security zone, and various levels of interaction occur in the influence zone. However, in Syria, nothing is stable. Even Russia shares its concerns with Israel about the clashes between the regime and the Alawites in western Syria.

These conflicts are occurring near Russian bases, where many Alawites are seeking refuge. Israel currently has no intention of intervening, especially since the tensions between the Sunni-jihadist regime in Damascus and the Alawite Assad supporters on the coast arose due to the Alawites’ intent to rebel against the new regime in Damascus—much like the Sunnis once rebelled against the Alawite Assad family.

Israel is observing from the sidelines, enforcing its policies primarily through its air force, and is transparent about its preference for Syria to become a federation. While Israel has no intention of occupying the country, Netanyahu and Katz aim to shape a new demilitarized reality south of Damascus near Israel’s border.

Posted on March 11, 2025

Source: (This article was originally published by Ynetnews on March 11, 2025. See original article at this link.)

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